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7.1  Introduction 
Since World War 11, the rapid improvements in the technologies-data  pro- 
cessing and telecommunications-underlying  financial services have increas- 
ingly allowed firms in these markets to offer more financial services over wider 
geographic areas. One important consequence has been the potential or actual 
internationalization of many financial services.' Firms in the financial services 
industries are increasingly  operating and offering their  services in multiple 
countries; savers and investors are increasingly willing to channel their capital 
flows across national boundaries; and borrowers and securities issuers are in- 
creasingly seeking sources of funds across those same national boundaries. 
In this environment, the national regulatory regimes that were designed for 
an earlier era, when financial markets were largely local or national in scope, 
are under strain. National regulators are clearly concerned about their ability 
to exercise their regulatory authority in this era of international flows and func- 
tions.* It is no accident that a number of international coordinating organiza- 
tions-for  example, the Cooke (Basel) Committee for commercial banks and 
the  International  Organization  of  Securities Commissions (IOSC0)-have 
been formed during these recent decades. 
A recumng plea by  national  and international  regulatory officials is that 
important aspects of financial regulation  should be harmonized  internation- 
ally-in  essence, made uniform across the major countries involved in these 
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financial services.?  This, it is claimed, will create a “level playing  field” for 
market participants and prevent a “race to the bottom” among competing coun- 
tries’  regulatory  regimes,  which  would  harm financial  market  participants. 
There are others, however, who believe that much national financial regulation 
has the effect (whether by design or by inadvertence) of preventing the efficient 
allocation of resources by  financial markets.4 In this view, the harmonization 
of these regulations would reinforce and perpetuate these inefficiencies, and 
compefition among regulatory regimes would likely enhance the efficiency of 
capital flows. 
This paper provides an analytical framework for evaluating these conflicting 
approaches to the international regulation of financial services. In this paper, I 
focus primarily on securities  market^,^ but the lessons are valid for other fi- 
nancial services as well. The framework that I employ is that of analyzing both 
“market failure” (the structural conditions under which a market may fail to 
deliver the efficiency results promised by the textbook model of competition) 
and “government failure” (the reasons that government regulation may fail to 
correct and may even exacerbate the market imperfections that an omniscient 
and benevolent government might otherwise be expected to eradicate).h  I argue 
that this framework applies to competition  between  exchanges and between 
national regulatory regimes as well as to competition between firms. 
Using this framework, I find that there may be some regulatory areas where 
effective harmonization could improve the efficiency of securities markets. But 
in many other areas, competition among regulatory regimes is likely to be the 
best way to achieve efficiency in capital markets. One of the major goals of this 
paper is to provide the basis for distinguishing between the two approaches. 
This paper proceeds as follows: In section 7.2, a vocabulary and taxonomy 
of different types of regulation-useful  for the analysis that follows-is  estab- 
lished. Section 7.3 discusses the main categories of market failure and relates 
these categories to the types of regulation that might be used to remedy them; 
it also outlines the major sources of government failure. In section 7.4, I pull 
these strands together to analyze the harmonization-versus-competition  ques- 
tions. Section 7.5 offers a brief conclusion. 
7.2  Types of Regulation 
For the purposes of  this paper,  I define regulation  to mean any nonfiscal 
governmental intervention  (ie., excluding  specific taxes or subsidies)  in the 
3. See the references cited in footnote 2. See also Grundfest (1990); Steil (1992, 1993); Worth 
4. See Kane (1991, 1992); Benston (1992a); and Steil(1992, 1993). 
5.  By securities markets, I mean the markets (which need not he organized around an exchange) 
for financial instruments of all kinds, including foreign exchange; in essence, I am excluding pri- 
marily the financial intermediation that occurs directly through banks, insurance companies, and 
pension funds (though these institutions are often involved in transactions  that encompass the 
instruments that are the focus of this paper). 
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operation of private-sector markets. This regulation can be in the form of laws 
passed by legislatures, formal edicts issued by regulatory bodies, or informal 
guidance or interpretations offered by a government agency. This definition of 
regulation clearly encompasses a broad range of  governmental intervention in 
markets. But regulation is not simply an undifferentiated mass of governmental 
intervention. It is possible to find commonalities among major types of regula- 
tion, which will prove useful for the discussion  in the later sections in this 
paper. I offer three major categories. 
Economic regulation usually involves limitations on prices, profits, andor 
entry into or exit from an  activity.’  Familiar examples outside the financial 
services  area  would  include the  pre- 1980s regulation  of  airline prices  and 
routes by the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB); the regulation of local elec- 
tricity, natural  gas, and telephone  company prices  and profits  by individual 
state regulatory commissions; and limitations on local taxicab fees and entry 
by many cities. 
Within the financial securities area, the pre- 1970s blessing by the U.S. Secu- 
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the New York Stock Exchange’s 
(NYSE) system of minimum fixed commissions would be one example; the 
American Glass-Steagall Act’s limitations, which largely prevent commercial 
banks from entering the securities business and prevent securities firms from 
operating  commercial banks,  are a  second;x limitations  by  various national 
governments as to what kinds of firms (including a determination of the nation- 
ality of their owners or their country of incorporation) can engage in various 
kinds of securities activities are a third.9 
Health-safety-environment (H-S-E)  regulation typically involves mandated 
changes in production  processes  andor product  qualities or types.I0 Nonfi- 
nance examples include the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s safety re- 
quirements for airlines (including minimum requirements for their aircraft, pi- 
lots, and procedures); the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) safety 
requirements with respect to pharmaceuticals and food additives; the U.S. En- 
vironmental Protection Agency’s maximum limits on the emissions of air pol- 
lutants from electric utilities  (and other stationary  sources) and from motor 
vehicles;  and the U.S.  Occupational  Safety and Health Administration’s re- 
quirements for workplace safety. 
In the securities area, examples would include the SEC’s minimum capital 
requirements  for broker-dealers;  its requirement that securities firms’ “regis- 
tered representatives” should be licensed, should “know their customers,” and 
should recommend only investments that are suitable for the specific circum- 
7. For overviews, see Breutigam (1989); and Joskow and Rose (1989). 
8. Loopholes, discovered by  sharp-eyed lawyers in the 1980s, have allowed a few commercial 
banks to engage in securities underwriting and have allowed some securities firms to operate “non- 
bank banks.” 
9. These limitations extend beyond considerations of safety and soundness. 
10. Together with  information regulation, this form of  regulation is sometimes described as 
“social regulation.” For an overview, see Gmenspecht and Lave (1989). 210  Lawrence J. White 
stances of their customers; its requirement that only accredited investors (e.g., 
institutions) be allowed to purchase private-placement  securities; and its re- 
quirement that money market mutual funds limit their holdings of low-quality 
commercial paper. 
Information regulation typically involves the requirement that sellers attach 
specified types of information to the goods and services that they sell. Nonfi- 
nance examples include the U.S. Department of Transportation’s requirement 
that an airline’s ads for special fares should include (in fine print) the major 
details of  the  special fares’ limitations; a state utility  commission’s require- 
ments that electric or telephone utility bills include specified types of informa- 
tion; the FDA’s  requirements for labeling to accompany pharmaceuticals and 
processed foods; and a local taxicab commission’s requirement that a cab driv- 
er’s name and license number be prominently displayed. 
In  the securities area, examples of  information regulation  abound: for ex- 
ample, the SEC’s requirements that issuers of publicly traded securities should 
disclose extensive information at the time of issuance and then disclose exten- 
sive information  at periodic  intervals  and on a uniform (generally accepted 
accounting  principles,  or  GAAP) basis;  its  requirement  that  mutual  funds 
should report yield information on a specific and standardized basis; and its 
requirements that a publicly traded company’s insiders disclose their holdings 
and trading activities. 
These three regulatory categories are not airtight and may blur at the edges. 
Some forms of economic regulation may have some real or alleged H-S-E  jus- 
tifications or effects (e.g., the CAB’s airline regulation  or the Glass-Steagall 
restrictions). Also, the CAB’s entry restrictions on airlines clearly impeded the 
development of an important production technology (“hub and spokes” sched- 
uling), which  emerged  only  after deregulation;  and profit  limitations in the 
form of rate-of-return  restrictions are likely to influence input choices in pro- 
duction.” Further, virtually all forms of H-S-E and information regulation have 
some cost consequences,  with implications for prices, profits,  and possibly 
even entry. Nevertheless,  the intent, form, and direct consequences  of these 
three types of  regulation  are generally distinct enough that this typology  is 
useful for furthering our understanding of regulatory goals, processes, and ef- 
fects. 
7.3  Market Failure and Government Failure 
7.3.1  Market Failure 
What might justify the forms of regulation just described? In principle, per- 
fectly competitive  markets  ought to achieve efficient  outcomes  without  the 
11. This is frequently described as the Averch-Johnson effect; for a summary, see Baumol and 
Klevorick (1970). 211  International Regulation of Securities: Competition or Harmonization? 
need for any governmental intervention. But real-world markets may exhibit 
one or more types of “market failure” that would preclude their achieving those 
efficient outcomes. These market failures can be categorized as follows. 
Market powel: If one or a few sellers are present in a market and entry is not 
easy, the quantity sold is likely to be smaller and the equilibrium price is likely 
to be higher than would be true for an otherwise similar competitive industry. 
This is frequently described as the problem of monopoly or oligopoly. 
Market power can arise (when entry is not easy) through explicit or implicit 
collusion among sellers (e.g., price-fixing conspiracies); through mergers that 
significantly reduce the numbers of  firms and increase their market shares, 
thereby  making  explicit  or implicit  collusion  easier; through  technological 
conditions  (e.g.,  economies of  scale) that  limit the number  of  efficient-size 
firms that can serve a market (e.g., the monopolies of local exchange telephone 
service or of local electricity generation); or through government restrictions 
that prevent entry and thereby protect market incumbents (e.g., the CAB’S re- 
strictions on entry  into the airline industry).  In the  securities area, the pre- 
1970s agreement among NYSE member firms as to minimum brokerage com- 
missions collectively gave those firms market power. The protected position of 
specialist  market makers in most  stocks listed on the NYSE similarly gave 
them market power. Specialists today in stocks where trading volumes are in- 
sufficient to permit competitive market makers may still enjoy some residual 
market power. 
Economies of scale. The presence of economies of scale may serve as a source 
of pricing inefficiency even if the seller is not exploiting market power. If the 
technology of production in a relevant market is such that larger volumes (per 
unit of  time) always imply  lower unit costs,1Z  then the efficient outcome of 
setting price equal to marginal costs may not be feasible, since it would not 
allow the firm to recover its full costs. Systems of local telephone service or 
electricity  distribution  may be of  this nature.  In the finance area, securities 
markets appear to exhibit economies of scale, since greater volumes of transac- 
tions (greater liquidity) are usually accompanied by smaller transaction costs 
(narrower spreads). 
Externality (spillover)  effects. If, as a consequence of  a firm’s production  or 
an individual’s consumption, there are direct and uncompensated effects on 
others-negative  or positive-outside  of a market framework, then the market 
outcome (even with a competitive structure) will not be efficient. With negative 
externalities (e.g., air or water pollution or traffic congestion), too much of the 
12. This is a separate phenomenon from that of  a “learning curve,” which involves reductions 
in unit costs as a consequence of the accumulated production volume over any extended period of 
time. This latter phenomenon more closely resembles a process of  gradual technological change. 212  Lawrence J. White 
good or service will be produced or consumed, and the price will be too low; 
also, too little effort and resources will be devoted to correcting or reducing 
the externality. With positive externalities  (e.g., when one firm learns about 
improved production processes because of the efforts of other firms), too little 
of the good or service will be produced, and its price will be too high; also, 
too little effort will be devoted to enhancing the externality. 
The usual source of externalities is the absence or poor specification of prop- 
erty rights and/or difficulties in enforcing them. For example, problems of air 
or water pollution can arise from the absence of clearly defined property rights 
in clean air or water and/or the free-rider problems that would accompany any 
single party’s efforts to enforce its property rights. In the securities area, an 
example of negative externalities would be the negative consequences for other 
securities firms if the fraudulent actions of one firm were to cause the public to 
believe that other firms could or would act fraudulently;  an example of positive 
externalities would be one firm’s learning about another firm’s development of 
a new securities product and thereby being able to develop and offer a similar 
product. 
Public Goods. A “public good” is one in which the marginal costs of an extra 
party’s enjoying the benefits of  the good are relatively low or zero and exclu- 
sion from those benefits is difficult or impossible. In essence, a public good is 
one in which the positive externalities are substantial and per~asive.’~  Again, 
competitive markets will produce too little (or none) of the good or service, 
and its price will be too high. The provision of national defense, a police force’s 
accomplishments in reducing the level of criminal activity in a community, a 
community’s effort to control or eradicate mosquitos, and an individual’s cre- 
ation of an idea (information) that is useful to others would all be examples of 
public goods. 
In the securities area, the previous example of one firm’s developing a prod- 
uct that other firms can copy would qualify as an example of a public good; 
similarly, the price established in one market for a security may be useful to 
participants in other markets and would constitute a public good, as would the 
information  developed  by  a  securities  analyst  for distribution  to his  or her 
clients. 
Uncertainty and the absence of  complete knowledge. If individuals do not have 
complete knowledge about the present and future choices that are before them, 
they face uncertainty and risk as to the consequences of their choices and ac- 
tions. Since most individuals  are likely to be risk averse, they are likely to 
take ameliorating or offsetting actions-for  example, acquiring information, 
forming portfolios, hedging-to  reduce their risk exposure. These offsetting 
13. Many of  the phenomena that are identified as negative externalities, such as air and water 
pollution, are thus really “negative public goods.” 213  International Regulation of Securities: Competition or Harmonization? 
actions often mean that additional resources must be expended. Also, with the 
presence of any uncertainty, individuals’ ex ante choices may yield ex post mis- 
takes. 
In the securities area, uncertainty and incomplete information are pervasive, 
but a major fraction of securities services offered are designed to ameliorate 
or offset the effects of uncertainty: for example, the services of  research firms 
and of rating  firms; the diversified  portfolios  offered  by mutual  funds; and 
the options, futures, and swaps instruments that are now an active part of the 
securities world. 
Asymmetric information. Problems of “asymmetric information” arise when a 
party on one side of a transaction has relevant information that the other side 
does not have.I4 For example, a seller of a good or service is likely to know 
more about its qualities and properties than does the buyer; an agent (e.g., a 
lawyer) is likely to know more about its actions than is the principal (e.g., a 
litigant) on behalf of whom the agent is expected to perform services; a bor- 
rower is likely to know more about its own prospects of repaying a loan than 
is a lender; a buyer of  insurance  is more likely to know about its own risk 
characteristics and the risk consequences of its prospective behavior than is a 
seller of insurance.IS In the absence of any amelioration  of these conditions, 
market participants may initially be “burned” by the outcome of these transac- 
tions but then learn to adjust their behavior-perhaps  by participating less in 
these transactions. Output of the relevant good or service is likely to be lower 
than if the asymmetric information phenomenon did not exist. Over time, mar- 
kets  may  develop  institutions  and  practices-for  example,  information- 
generating  entities,  certifying  agencies,  reliance  on reputation,  reliance  on 
“signals”-that  can ameliorate the problems of asymmetric information. But 
these institutions and practices, in turn, involve costs and imperfections that 
would not be present if the asymmetric information problem were somehow 
absent. 
Securities  markets  are an area where the problems of potential  or actual 
asymmetric  information  are pervasive.  Securities  issuers  know  more about 
themselves than do prospective purchasers of the securities. Corporate manag- 
ers know more about their activities than do shareholders or bondholders. A 
stock broker knows more about the quality of his or her services and recom- 
mendations than do the customers. Various information-based  institutions- 
14. For an overview, see Stiglitz (1989). 
15. These asymmetric information phenomena can usefully be grouped as “hidden information” 
problems (the “lemons” problem of  the buyer’s knowing less about the qualities of  the seller’s 
product than does the seller, or the “adverse selection” problem of  the insurance company’s know- 
ing less about the risk attributes of  its insureds than do the latter) or  as “hidden action” problems 
(the “agent-principal” problem of the buyer of services knowing less about the agent’s actions than 
does the latter, or the “moral hazard’ problem of the buyer of insurance engaging in more risky 
behavior because it is covered by  insurance than it would if it did not have coverage). See Arrow 
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accounting  firms, securities analysts, research  firms, rating agencies, invest- 
ment advisers-have  developed and flourished in efforts to ameliorate these 
problems  of  asymmetric information,  although  these institutions in turn  are 
likely to embody their own potential problems of asymmetric information. 
Individuals who are unable to know their own best interests. If individuals do 
not know  their own best interests,  then even complete information  will  not 
prevent mistaken choices. This form of  market failure is generally different 
from the problem of asymmetric information. If individuals are overwhelmed 
by the complexity of choices-for  example,  judging the safety of an airline or 
the quality of a hospital’s services-they  may rely on agents to help them (but 
with concomitant  agent-principal problems).  But if individuals do not know 
their own best interests, they may not even realize that they should be relying 
on agents, and they are unlikely to learn from their mistakes. 
This “widows and orphans” approach to individuals’ behavior is clearly a 
popular  one for legislators,  as is evidenced  by  numerous  regulatory  laws- 
including laws in the securities area-that  require that “unsafe” products and 
services be banned  from markets  (rather than  allowing  individuals, or their 
agents, to make their own choices and trade-offs).  Even if it is an accurate 
characterization of a portion of a society (beyond the categories of “children” 
and “mentally incompetent” to which it clearly would apply), the presence of 
others who are capable of making sensible choices then poses a difficult prob- 
lem of how best to deal with safety issues in a society with diverse decision- 
making capabilities. 
Problems of  “second best.”  If an uncorrected  market imperfection  or failure 
exists in one market, then it will generally be true that unhindered competition 
in that market or in a related market (i.e., one in which there are demand or 
supply consequences from the initial imperfection) will not yield socially opti- 
mal results (see Lipsey and Lancaster 1956-57). 
7.3.2  A Caveat and a Linkage 
This listing of the major forms of market failure may initially encourage the 
impression that virtually  all markets are ripe for governmental intervention. 
After all, few (if any) real-world  markets  would  fit the textbook  ideal of  a 
perfectly competitive market. As will be argued below, however, governments 
also are far from perfect. The notion of the omniscient and benevolent govern- 
mental agency that can perfectly correct the failures of the private sector is also 
a textbook construct that few (if any) real-world government agencies could 
replicate. In sum, since both real-world markets and real-world governments 
exhibit varying degrees of imperfection, the actual policy debate concerning 
regulation (e.g., whether to regulate, how to regulate, the breadth of regulation, 
etc.) must always involve choices among imperfect markets and imperfect gov- 
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Subject to this caveat, this listing of  the sources of market failure can be 
linked to the  types of regulation  discussed in  section 7.2. The problems  of 
market power and of economies of scale may be best treated through economic 
regulation;I6 externalities, public  goods,  and  individuals’ being  unaware  of 
their own best interests may be best approached through H-S-E regulation;” 
the problems of incomplete information and asymmetric information may be 
best approached through some combination of H-S-E and information regula- 
tion; and problems of “second best” are, in principle, the domain of any form 
of regulation. 
7.3.3  Government Failure 
Though government  regulation can in principle improve the efficiency  of 
imperfect  markets,  governments  too can fail to deliver  their promised  out- 
comes, and their efforts at intervention can cause the efficiency of markets to 
deteriorate rather than increase. This government failure can occur for a num- 
ber of reasons. 
Difjculty in formulating clear and implementable goals. Without the specific 
profit goal that motivates most private enterprises, a government agency may 
well be buffeted by diffuse goals (e.g., improve the economy’s efficiency, im- 
prove the economy’s income or wealth  distribution, avoid economic disrup- 
tions, treat individuals  fairly) that are likely to be conflicting and difficult to 
translate  for  specific  implementation.  Overarching  goals  (e.g.,  “serve  the 
people”) may be even more subjective and open to conflicting interpretations 
and haphazard implementation. 
Weak (or absent) incentives. Again, without profit incentives or the threat of 
bankruptcy, the diffuse goals of a government agency may make difficult the 
development of incentives to motivate government employees to work toward 
those goals. Also, societal values concerning income distribution and greater 
equality of incomes are more likely to hold sway in the public sector, making 
a link between a government  employee’s performance  and his or her wages 
(with the likely consequences of  wage differentials) more difficult to imple- 
ment. Further, agency personnel may act in ways that enhance the importance 
and security of  their own jobs rather than pursuing the larger public interest 
that is supposed to be the mission of their agency. 
Difjculties of  management. To be effective, organizations have to be well man- 
aged. With diffuse goals, government agencies are likely to be more difficult 
16. Government ownership and taxes and subsidies are other possible tools of intervention. 
17. Again, taxes (effluent fees) and subsidies are other possible tools for dealing with externali- 
ties and public goods. The creation and enforcement of property rights in “intellectual property” 
(i.e., patents, copyrights,  and trademarks) is yet  another way  of dealing with the public goods 
problems that arise in the context of the creation of ideas and information. 216  Lawrence J. White 
to manage than are organizations with more specific goals. And in any event, 
good management is a relatively scarce skill that usually commands premium 
wages in an economy. The egalitarian  ethos that makes performance-linked 
pay difficult to implement in government agencies also tends to cause compres- 
sion in the overall government wage scale, so that low-skill jobs are usually 
overpaid (as compared to their private-market counterparts) and high-skill jobs 
are underpaid. As a consequence, governments frequently  have difficulty in 
attracting  and retaining  highly  skilled  individuals,  including  managers,  and 
government effectiveness suffers.’* 
Inadequate information. Government agencies may be no better at acquiring 
and using information than private-sector entitie~.’~  Indeed, the previously de- 
scribed problems of incentives and management would argue that government 
agencies may well have substantial difficulties in this respect. But with inade- 
quate information, government agencies are likely to be plagued by the same 
types of problems and inefficiencies that were raised as potential market fail- 
ures for private-sector entities. Regulatory controls based on poor information 
could well be costly; government regulators are likely to face asymmetric in- 
formation problems vis-2-vis their regulated entities.*O 
Rent-seeking behavio,: In an economy of gain-seeking individuals, those who 
are significantly affected by  government action are unlikely  to remain  pas- 
sive.21  Instead, they are likely to try to influence governmental processes to 
achieve outcomes that are favorable to themselves  (“rent seeking”) and will 
find worthwhile the expenditure of considerable resources (ranging from out- 
right bribery and corruption to more subtle lobbying and promises of electoral 
support) in efforts to twist government policy and actions in their favor. Even 
if these rent-seeking individuals and groups do not succeed in affecting poli- 
cies (i.e., in “capturing” an agency or a legislature, as is discussed below), their 
efforts may well use up substantial real resources. 
Rent-creating capture. Comparatively small groups of individuals who are po- 
tentially affected a great deal by government actions will have the most to gain 
18. Government agencies may be able to attract some highly skilled individuals who hope to 
acquire the specific skills related to government operation and then leave to use those skills in the 
private sector. For example, the U.S. government has been able to attract young lawyers, even 
though its entry-level pay scale has been below the levels of the private-sector alternatives. But 
the flow of  skilled human resources at senior levels is usually one-way-from  government to the 
private sector-with  the exception of  short-term political appointments. The exceptions to this 
overall pattern are individuals who strongly believe that government service has an  important 
intrinsic value and are willing to enter and remain in government service despite unfavorable pay 
differentials vis-a-vis the private sector. 
19. For overviews and further discussion, see Stiglitz (1988, 1990). 
20. For an overview, see Baron (1989). 
21. See Krueger (1974); and, for an overview, Noll(l989). 217  International Regulation of  Securities: Competition or Harmonization? 
from organizing  themselves  to influence  government  policy  in  their  favor. 
Their  success  in  achieving rent-creating  policies-for  example,  regulatory 
protection-is  likely to be at the expense of the general public. The latter, with 
each individual suffering only a small loss as a consequence  of  the altered 
policies, find the organizational costs of trying to oppose the changes to be too 
high. Consequently, rent-creating “special interest” regulatory  measures and 
outcomes are likely to prevail, at the expense of the general population and of 
efficiency in the economy.22 
Pursuit of  income redistribution. A society may well decide that it is dissatis- 
fied with the income distribution among individuals that would arise as the 
consequence of the workings of markets, whether those markets are operating 
perfectly or imperfectly. Government  action is the vehicle for redistribution, 
and regulation can be an important means of implicitly affecting the distribu- 
tion of income (see Posner 1971) (though taxes and subsidies are more com- 
mon and more direct). But these actions surely create inefficiencies, even if 
they  are  successful  at redistributing  income  (see Okun  1975). Further,  the 
greater is the perceived legitimacy of government as a redistributive force, the 
greater is the potential for the rent-seeking behavior and rent-creating capture 
discussed above. 
Regulatory efforts to achieve “fair” outcomes-as  is true of much regulation 
in the securities area-would  fall into this same general category. Though the 
regulation may apparently be aimed at correcting specific imperfections (for 
example, informational deficiencies or asymmetries or market power prob- 
lems), the inclusion of “fairness” as a goal will usually imply some explicit or 
implicit notions of income redistribution (as compared with what an unregu- 
lated market would yield). 
7.3.4  A Stronger Caveat 
The combination  of  rent-seeking  and rent-creating  behavior  and  societal 
concerns encompassing income distribution and “fairness” can create potent 
regulatory forces that impede the efficient functioning of markets. The Ameri- 
can regulatory landscape is littered with instances in which government agen- 
cies have practiced extensive economic regulation with the proffered justifi- 
cation  of  restricting  the  exercise  of  market  power  but  with  the  reality  of 
protecting and enhancing it. Examples at the federal level include airlines, rail 
transportation, trucking, banking, stock brokerage commissions, long-distance 
telephone service, and broadcasting; examples at the state and local levels in- 
clude  trucking,  banking,  long-distance  and  local  telephone  service,  and 
taxicabs  .23 
22. See Stigler (1971); Posner (1974); Peltzman (1976); and, for an overview, No11  (1989). 
23. Discussion and examples can he found in Phillips (1975); Weiss and Klass (1981, 1986); 
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Further, the regulatory goal of cross-subsidy-achieving  income redistribu- 
tion by keeping prices paid by some users above long-run marginal costs so as 
to be able to use the surplus to keep the prices paid by other users below long- 
run marginal costs-has  been an additional force for the employment of  the 
tools of economic regulation in ways that protect and enhance market power. 
If  prices are to be kept above long-run  marginal costs, entrants must be pre- 
vented from “cream-skimming” or “cherry-picking’’ these supraprofitable mar- 
kets, and market incumbents must also be protected from “excessive” competi- 
tion among themselves in these markets; hence, these regulatory regimes must 
prevent entry and restrict competition among incumbents. Many of  the per- 
verse examples of  economic regulation that were just cited have involved, at 
least in part, efforts to achieve cross-subsidy. 
At first glance, H-S-E regulation would seem less susceptible to the forms 
of abuse and perverse application just described. But there are “winners” and 
“losers” arising from virtually every H-S-E regulatory action; and the combi- 
nation  of  less-than-omniscient  regulatory  bodies,  rent-seeking  and  rent- 
creating behavior, and the importance of “fairness” as a societal goal can lead 
to regulatory efforts and outcomes that involve substantial market distortions 
and ineffi~iencies.~~  The mantle of H-S-E goals can also serve to cloak protec- 
tionist and exclusionary measures, such as the Glass-Steagall Act’s barrier be- 
tween commercial banking and investment bankingsz5 
Further, the costs of  regulation can have disproportionate effects on some 
types of firms as compared with others; for example, there are frequently sub- 
stantial fixed costs to complying with H-S-E regulation, which thereby favors 
larger firms (which can spread these costs over larger volumes of output) over 
smaller  If the form and extent of the regulation is otherwise appro- 
priate, then these are just the legitimate social costs of doing business, which 
may have the same kind of uneven effects as the purchase of a necessary but 
expensive piece of eq~ipment.~’  But if the type or extent of regulation is inap- 
propriate and it has an uneven impact (e.g., disadvantaging smaller or newer 
firms), protectionism in outcome-and  possibly in intent-is  an added feature 
of such regulation.2x 
Information regulation almost always has costs as well as benefits and thus 
is susceptible to the same problem of potential inappropriateness of types and 
levels as was just described for H-S-E regulation. And, though information 
24. For examples and further discussion, see White (1981); Gruenspecht and Lave (1989);  and 
Viscusi (1994). 
25. Similarly, safety claims are sometimes used to justify the Bank Holding Company Act’s 
general separation of commercial banking and insurance. 
26. This disproportionate impact on small firms is exacerbated when H-S-E regulation takes the 
form of “design standards” (i.e., a specific process or type of‘ equipment is mandated) rather than 
“performance standards” (i.e., a specific result on performance is required). The latter type of 
standard would give smaller firms greater flexibility in meeting a given requirement. 
27. Again, the inflexibility of design standards would exacerbate the impact. 
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regulation is less likely to be explicitly exclusionary, the combination of inap- 
propriate levels and large fixed costs is likely to have implicit exclusionary 
effects on smaller firms. 
In sum, the real-world imperfections of government have yielded numerous 
instances  of  the  regulatory  process’s  being  used  for abusive  purposes  and 
reaching inefficient outcomes. Indeed, the deregulation movement of the late 
1970s and the 1980s was a reaction to these abusive purposes and inefficient 
outcomes, especially in the economic regulation areasz9  These abuses need 
not lead to the conclusion that all governmental regulation should be forsaken. 
But they do point toward constant caution in embracing new regulation (na- 
tional or international) and toward the value of frequent reassessments of the 
motives, methods, and outcomes of existing regulatory regimes. 
7.4  Harmonization versus Competition 
7.4.1  The Widening Scope of Competition 
The process  of  competition  among  firms  can  be  analyzed  as occurring 
within the confines of  a market; indeed, one useful definition of a market is 
the collection of sellers that are in effective competition with each other.30  This 
market may be embodied in a formal structure, with a physical representation 
and legal ownership framework, as is true for securities exchanges; or the mar- 
ket may simply be a group of  firms that are effectively competing with each 
other. 
As the costs of transacting over longer distances fall (e.g., because of im- 
provements in the technologies of transportation, telecommunications, and/or 
data processing), markets widen:  buyers  and  sellers that are located farther 
apart can now more easily transact with each other. Also, if changes in produc- 
tion or product technologies  allow incumbent  firms more easily to produce 
and sell a wider array of products and/or allow new opportunities for entrants, 
markets are again widened: buyers face more sellers that are competing for the 
former’s purchases. 
In the absence of formal market structures, the process of market widening 
is fully described by the larger numbers of  sellers and/or buyers that are en- 
compassed. To the extent that groups of sellers initially believe that they consti- 
tute a local market and then find themselves enmeshed in a larger market, the 
description below of wider competition among formal market structures, such 
as exchanges, may apply as well; a local trade association may be the vehicle 
through which the concerns of the local group are expressed. 
29. See, for example, Weiss and Klass (1986); Joskow and Rose (1989); White (1993, n.d.); 
Winston (1993); and Joskow and No11  (1994). 
30. This is approximately the market definition approach underlying the “Merger Guidelines’’ 
that guides US. merger antitrust policy. See U.S. Department of  Justice (1992); and, for discus- 
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But where formal market structures are present, there is an additional ele- 
ment: the wider markets mean that the formal market structures (e.g., securities 
exchanges) themselves are in competition with each other-for  sellers as well 
as buyers (see Bradley 1992). In essence, with improved technology both buy- 
ers and sellers can “evade” (or arbitrage) any higher costs of transacting in a 
“local” market by conducting their transactions in a more “distant” market- 
where “distance”  may represent  either geographic  mileage or the extent  of 
product dissimilarity. Securities exchanges in the United  States have histori- 
cally experienced such market widening as well as the concomitant intensified 
competition: geographically separated stock exchanges have increasingly com- 
peted among themselves (and with the less formally organized Nasdaq market 
system) for members, for listings, and for order flow.  The stock exchanges 
have increasingly competed with the exchanges that trade other (but somewhat 
similar) kinds of instruments (e.g., options and futures). All exchanges are in- 
creasingly competing with over-the-counter (OTC) transactions in stocks and 
in customized swaps, options, and futures. And in the 1990s, the U.S. markets 
and exchanges are facing increased international competition, as are the mar- 
kets and exchanges located in other co~ntries.~’ 
Similarly, if regulatory regimes have responsibility for local markets or ex- 
changes, the widening of  the markets represents a potential erosion of their 
authority: buyers or sellers can more easily evade these regimes’ regulatory 
strictures (if they are burdensome) by transacting in an out-of-jurisdiction mar- 
ket or exchange. Previously separate and autonomous regulatory regimes are 
increasingly conscious of  each other’s jurisdiction  and potential  for snaring 
transaction  volumes by  reducing  their regulatory burden. To  the extent that 
regulatory agencies are concerned about avoiding the loss of transactions from 
their jurisdictions-because  of  concern as to the possible consequences for 
buyers or sellers within their jurisdictions of  such out-of-jurisdiction transac- 
tion~,~~  or  because  of  worries  by  agency  personnel  that  reduced  within- 
jurisdiction  volumes  might bring into question the size of  their agency and 
perhaps even the justification for their agency-they  are thereby implicitly or 
explicitly in competition with each other.33 
Again, the American experience is instructive. So long as the widening of 
securities markets remained within the United States and was largely confined 
to equity instruments, the SEC did not feel seriously threatened, although it 
31. It is worth noting that the globalization of  markets has displayed a pattern that is quite 
consistent with the predictions of the asymmetric information paradigm. An overview (Bodner 
1990) describes the process of globalization as most advanced for foreign exchange, next for gov- 
ernment obligations, third for corporations’ debt (bonds), and least for corporate equity markets. 
This ranking is consistent with the transparency and simplicity of the various types of instruments 
and the information disadvantage that nonnational transactors would experience relative to na- 
tional entities. 
32. For example, the regulators may be concerned that within-jurisdiction sellers are unduly 
losing sales or that within-jurisdiction buyers are not being adequately protected. 
33. See, for example, Scott (1977); Bloch (1985); Isaac (1994); and Coffee (1995). 221  International Regulation of  Securities: Competition or Harmonization? 
clearly felt more comfortable dealing with the NYSE and its member firms 
and was somewhat worried about its weakened control over OTC and off-floor 
transactions. With the rise of the financial options and futures markets in the 
early 1970s-largely  in Chicago, away from the SEC’s traditional eastern sea- 
board focus-and  the establishment of the Commodity Futures Trading Com- 
mission (CFTC) in 1975 to regulate some of these  however, the SEC 
faced more serious challenges to its authority and jurisdiction. Its two decades 
of coexistence with the CFTC have been marked by alternating periods of open 
political battles for jurisdiction, uneasy political truces, and sporadic efforts at 
harmonization (see, e.g., Kane  1986 and Johnson  1992). And both agencies 
now face international competition in the 1990s-as  do the national regulatory 
agencies of other countries. 
A current regulatory issue typifies the SEC’s concerns about transnational 
regulatory c~mpetition:~~  Should the SEC maintain its requirements that all 
companies whose equity shares are listed for trading in the United States (on 
an exchange or in other markets) must report their financial information ac- 
cording  to U.S. GAAP? Or will unyielding  insistence  on this requirement 
cause non-U.S. companies (for whom a restatement of their financial informa- 
tion to conform with U.S. GAAP is an extra cost) to decline to list their shares 
for trading in the United States, thereby disadvantaging U.S. exchanges and 
market makers? But would relaxation of the GAAP reporting requirements for 
all firms mean that U.S.  investors would be less well informed and protected? 
Or if  the SEC relaxed the GAAP reporting requirements only for non-US. 
firms, would U.S. firms be somehow disadvantaged? And would U.S. investors 
in these non-U.S. companies’ shares thereby be at an information disadvantage 
because of the less-complete information that they would receive? But, if the 
SEC maintains its strict GAAP requirements, will U.S. investors simply evade 
the SEC’s efforts to protect them by  purchasing  these non-U.S. companies’ 
shares through  markets or exchanges abroad, albeit with larger transaction 
costs? 
7.4.2  Some Generic Answers 
We can now restate the questions that have motivated this paper. In an envi- 
ronment of near-global securities competition, when (if ever) is international 
harmonization of national securities regulation likely to improve the efficiency 
of securities markets? Conversely, when (if ever) is an absence of international 
harmonization, and thus a process of implicit or explicit competition among 
national  regulatory  regimes,  likely  to improve  the  efficiency  of  securities 
markets? 
34. The CFTC also acquired regulatory authority over the agricultural and mineral (metals) 
commodities futures markets. The former set of markets had previously been regulated by the US. 
Department of Agriculture; the latter set had been largely unregulated. 
35. For further discussion, see Edwards (1992); Freund (1993, 1995); Shapiro (1993); and Tor- 
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The framework of section 7.3 provides a basis for generic answers to these 
questions:36  for international harmonization to be potentially worthwhile, there 
must be some form of  market failure (e.g., market power or externality) that 
transcends national  boundaries and for which  individual national regulatory 
efforts are somehow inadequate.  But even in such instances the dangers of 
internationally harmonized government failure should lead to caution in en- 
dorsing a harmonization approach. 
The application of these principles to securities markets leads to the follow- 
ing general approach to the international harmonization questions. 
Proharmonization. The conditions under which international harmonization of 
a specific regulatory provision could improve the efficiency of securities mar- 
kets would be one or more of the following: (I) The specific national regula- 
tory provision is efficiently addressing a genuine market-failure condition and 
“evasive” transactions abroad would somehow undermine that effort. (2)  The 
process of harmonization itself may be a vehicle for relaxing the stringency of 
protectionist national  regulations that have created pockets of  market power. 
(3) The process of harmonization  itself may be a means of  simplifying and 
making more uniform a diverse set of different national rules and procedures, 
with the consequence of  lowering the transaction costs for those who try to 
transact on a multinational basis. (There is a separate question-whether  har- 
monization, even if desirable, can succeed in an environment of international 
competition-to  which we will return below.) 
Procompetition. The conditions under which international competition among 
specific  regulatory  requirements  could  improve  the  efficiency  of  securities 
markets would be one or both of the following: (1) The regulatory provision is 
not efficiently addressing a genuine market failure but instead is the product 
of  one or more of  the government-failure conditions  and is thereby  a force 
for decreased efficiency; evasive transactions abroad are thus a proefficiency 
response (albeit an unnecessarily  costly one) to the regulation; harmonization 
(to the  extent  it succeeds)  would only  buttress  the  national  effort at ineffi- 
ciency; by contrast, international competition of regulatory regimes would re- 
duce the  likelihood  that  the  inefficient  regulation  could  persist  and  would 
thereby  increase  efficiency.  (2)  The  forced  uniformity  that  harmonization 
would bring would mean too great a loss of diversity and of valuable adapta- 
tions to local (national) conditions; also, even if uniformity at the proper regu- 
latory standard would be better (e.g., because of cost savings) than local diver- 
sity, the  risk  that  a forced  harmonization  would  occur  at  an  inappropriate 
regulatory standard (because of the foibles of government failure) is too great. 
36. A somewhat similar framework was adopted by White (1986) in addressing the question of 
competition among states to attract industry and by  Bebchuk (1992) to address and review the 
literature on the competition among states to be the state of incorporation for U.S. companies. See 
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In my judgment, competition-whether  among firms, among markets and 
exchanges, or among national regulatory regimes-ought  to be the “default 
option”; that is, in the absence of a strong showing that there is a substantial 
market failure and that the problems of government failure can be overcome so 
as to create a reasonable likelihood that government intervention will improve 
outcomes,  the competitive  outcome  should prevail.  For the harmonization- 
versus-competition controversy, this position would imply that those who favor 
the  international  harmonization  of  specific  national  regulatory  provisions 
should bear a substantial burden of making a convincing case. As is discussed 
below, there do seem to be specific instances where international harmoniza- 
tion may well be desirable; but the presumption should be in favor of competi- 
tion, and a strong affirmative case for harmonization must be made in these 
specific instances. 
7.4.3  Some Specific Examples 
Most of  the discussions of  international harmonization of national regula- 
tion have been at a very broad level of generality and vagueness, and it is often 
difficult to determine exactly what regulatory provisions are candidates for har- 
monization. No one seems to be suggesting that the entire multifoot pile of 
U.S. laws and regulations  that are the province of  the  SEC and the  CFTC 
should be subject to international harmonization. But the specific regulatory 
provisions that might be the subject of harmonization are often unstated. Ac- 
cordingly, the use of  the regulatory  classification  system of  section 7.2 is a 
reasonable way to proceed in examining some specific areas where harmoniza- 
tion might be worthwhile and others where harmonization is likely instead to 
be yet another instance of  government failure dominating and worsening the 
market outcome. 
Economic Regulation 
As was discussed in section 7.3, economic regulation in principle can be a 
means of correcting the problems of market power. Where it is doing so effec- 
tively, the process of harmonization seems unnecessary; indeed, the widening 
of markets and of competition is likely to aid the process of  limiting market 
power. But, as was also discussed in section 7.3, economic regulation in prac- 
tice has frequently been the means by which market power has been protected 
and enhanced, often in the service of  cross-subsidy.  In this context, interna- 
tional competition is a threat to national regulation, and harmonization could 
be a vehicle for buttressing  these anticompetitive national regulatory  provis- 
ions and worsening market outcomes. There are at least two examples outside 
the field of financial services where an international coordinating and harmo- 
nizing organization has substantially reinforced market power and restricted 
competition: the International Air Transport Association (IATA) in the field of 
airlines (see Kasper  1988) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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tionary counterexamples for anyone who might advocate international harmo- 
nization of national economic regulation. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that harmonization  could serve as a vehicle for 
decreasing the levels of national regulatory protectionism (i.e., decrease local 
market  power)  and subsidy.  The General  Agreement on Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT) is a useful example here. If the GATT, as a consequence of the Uru- 
guay Round of negotiations, or IOSCO could be the vehicle for mutual reduc- 
tions in the restrictive national regulatory treatments of nonnational financial 
service providers-under  the guise of  harmonization-the  results could be 
beneficial indeed. There is, of course, the possibility that such efforts could be 
transformed into a defense and strengthening of  protectionism; the IATA and 
UNCTAD counterexamples  should constantly be remembered for their cau- 
tionary value, and the American regulatory experience has been that some reg- 
ulatory bodies whose initial mandate was to limit market power were trans- 
formed over time into defenders  and protectors  of  market  power.  Still, the 
value of harmonization here could be great, and any vehicle through which it 
could be pursued should be encouraged. 
H-S-E  Regulation 
At first glance, the globalization of securities transactions would seem likely 
to extend to international markets the externalities  and spillover effects that 
motivate some forms of national H-S-E securities regulation and thus would 
seem to  justify harmonization to help control these effects. Upon closer exami- 
nation, however, the argument is more complicated. I explore specifically the 
issues of systemic risk and price-and-market relationships. 
Systemic risk. Concerns about market disruptions linked to the “systemic risk” 
caused by the failure of one or more financial services firms-arguably,  a form 
of externality-is  a dominant concern of national regulators. Much of the pan- 
oply of national  safety-and-soundness  (prudential) regulation of commercial 
banks  (e.g.,  minimum capital  requirements,  limitations  on suitable  invest- 
ments, extensive examination  and supervision procedures)  and the minimum 
capital requirements and other safety requirements for securities firms are mo- 
tivated by this regulatory concern about the consequences of insolvency and 
failure. 
Before asking whether these  national  concerns are a  legitimate basis for 
seeking international harmonization, it is worth considering the reasons why a 
firm’s insolvency and failure can have externality effects on financial markets. 
There are two alternative scenarios of systemic risk that are usually offered. 
The first might be termed the scenario of cascading failures: the insolvency 
failure of one large financial firm (commercial bank or securities firm) would 
rapidly lead to a series of  other failures, as firms that were substantial creditors 
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on yet more firms, and so  This was one of the scenarios that motivated 
U.S. bank regulators to keep an insolvent Continental Illinois open in 1984, 
rather than closing and liquidating it (see Sprague 1986); and it is a scenario 
that is often offered in discussions surrounding the risks of the operations of 
the large interbank funds transfer systems, such as FedWire and the Clearing 
House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS).38  It is instructive, though, that the 
failure of Drexel Bumham Lambert in early  1990 did not have any serious 
cascading consequences. 
The second scenario of systemic risk could be termed one of depositor runs: 
the fear of an insolvency failure (real or imagined) of a large institution causes 
depositors to run (withdraw their deposits in the form of cash) on the institution 
and on other institutions that they fear might be in similar straits. The anticipa- 
tion of such depositor runs, which could (at a minimum) impair an otherwise 
nonfearful depositor’s timely access to the liquidity of his or her deposits and 
could even lead to the premature closing and liquidation of an otherwise sol- 
vent bank, may itself spark runs (see Diamond and Dybvig 1983). 
Closer examination of the first scenario reveals the heart of that version of 
the problem: the asymmetric information  (“moral hazard”) problems related 
to financial institutions’ extending sizable amounts of credit to each other for 
short-term periods,  often as short as a few hours within a trading day. The 
primary responsibility for correction of this problem should be on the institu- 
tion that is extending the credit. Regulatory requirements of adequate capital 
levels, so that the firm can better withstand loan losses of any kind, are vital, 
as are limits on its loan exposure to any borrower. Or if virtually all of a firm’s 
exposure occurs through its transactions with other members of an exchange, 
the exchange may be an appropriate vehicle for ensuring payment; but the ex- 
change similarly must be adequately capitalized and must have a mechanism 
for limiting exposure. 
U.S.  banking regulations already encompass limits on a commercial bank’s 
exposure on commercial loans to any single borrower. The concept underlying 
these limits is a sensible one, and it should be broadened to include all exten- 
sions of credit for any length of time by any type of financial institution where 
a cascading systemic risk problem may be present. Furthel; the  logic of  this 
position  leads quickly and sensibly  to the conclusion that minimum capital 
requirements  for  financial institutions (banks or securities firms or exchanges) 
should be applicable on a continuous (real-time)  basis, rather than the periodic 
“snapshot” (e.g.,  end of calendar quarter)  basis that currently applies.  A firm’s 
exposure to default by others is on a continuous time basis, not just at discrete 
37. The “cascading failure” scenario could be exacerbated by  the “depositor run” scenario de- 
38. See Humphrey (1986); Dudley (1986); and the discussions in England (1991) and in the 
scribed below. 
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time intervals; the minimum capital requirements that protect its liability hold- 
ers should therefore be binding on a continuous time basis. 
With these changes, national  regulatory  provisions  should be adequate to 
prevent cascading consequences from institutional failures even in a world of 
major international interinstitutional financial flows. So long as national regu- 
latory agencies can ensure that their home-country institutions have adequate 
capital on a continuous basis and are not unduly exposed to default by  any 
borrower on a continuous basis,  systemic risk  can be  contained  nationally. 
International harmonization is not needed. 
Close examination of the depositor-runs version of the systemic risk prob- 
lem shows that it is a genuine externality problem (compounded by asymmet- 
ric information): each depositor’s act of withdrawing cash increases the proba- 
bility that other depositors will be unable to exercise their option to withdraw 
cash, thereby inducing the latter to move even earlier, and so forth. It is a prob- 
lem of  potential contagion. 
At the national level for commercial banks, a combination of a lender of last 
resort, a deposit insurer, and a strong safety-and-soundness regulator that relies 
heavily  on economic  incentives  (e.g., risk-based  minimum  capital  require- 
ments that are derived from a market value accounting system, the use of sub- 
ordinated debt as a required component of capital, and risk-based deposit in- 
surance premiums)  should be adequate  to deal with the problem  (see, e.g., 
White 1991, 1992). There are problems of how to deal with the local subsidiary 
and branch operations of a bank that is headquartered abroad but that offers 
deposit services to local residents (see Key and Scott  1991, 1992); but these 
can probably be handled adequately through cooperation and information ex- 
changes among national regulators. Similarly for securities firms, some form 
of  insurance  arrangement  for  customers  and  sensible  safety-and-soundness 
regulation  (again, encompassing  economic  incentives)  should be  adequate, 
with  some  international  cooperation  necessary  for  dealing  with  overseas 
branches, and so forth. 
In  principle,  the  problem  of  depositor runs could  extend  across national 
boundaries; in practice, the less sophisticated depositors or securities custom- 
ers who would be the most likely “stampeders” would be unlikely to be major 
transactors with banks and securities firms located outside a country. The trans- 
national transactors are likely to be more sophisticated (or have more sophisti- 
cated agents) and be more knowledgeable, and fear-driven contagion effects 
seem less likely. Again, it appears that national regulatory  efforts should be 
adequate, and international harmonization is not necessary. In this respect, it 
is worth noting that the  1991 failure of  the Bank for Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) did not exhibit significant contagion effects, nor did the 
1990 failure of Drexel. 
Is there any value to the harmonization  achieved by  the Base1 Accord on 
minimum capital levels for commercial banks and by  IOSCO’s efforts for a 
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ous conclusions, there is positive value from these harmonization efforts-but 
the rationale in support of  these harmonization efforts is more subtle than the 
two systemic risk arguments that have just been rejected. The value of  these 
harmonization arrangements is primarily in limiting the implicit subsidy that 
most governments seem prepared to provide to their major $financial institu- 
tions.  39 
This rationale can be most clearly seen for the case of  commercial banks. 
With or without the presence of explicit deposit insurance, most governments 
appear to be unwilling to force depositors to absorb the losses that would other- 
wise  fall  on  them  when  major  home-country  banks  become 
Though governments may be vague ex ante about their likely reactions, their 
ex post behavior has been consistent with this ~tatement.~~  In essence, govern- 
ments are absorbing the losses of these insolvent institutions and are thereby 
subsidizing risk taking by banks. International competition among banks (and 
their regulatory  regimes) places extra pressures on the banks to reduce their 
direct funding costs by reducing their capital levels. Competitive regulatory 
regimes accede, since they are reluctant to put the banks within their jurisdic- 
tion at a cost disadvantage. But with lower capital levels, banks are more sus- 
ceptible to failure and have greater incentives to engage in riskier behaviors, 
thereby raising the likelihood of  failure and thus raising the level of subsidy. 
The Basel Accord, by establishing a uniform set of  minimum capital stan- 
dards,  makes  this  competitive  regulatory  behavior  more  difficult  and  thus 
serves to limit the competitive subsidy process.42 
To the extent that governments would not be willing to have the creditors of 
securities firms absorb the losses from those failures, the same argument would 
39. One should ask why it is in the interest of country B’s  residents to prevent country A’s 
government from subsidizing A’s  banks. (After all, consumers in importing countries should gener- 
ally applaud when the governments of exporting countries subsidize their exports.) There are two 
answers. First, if country B’s banks are more efficient than A’s  banks, the subsidy will discourage 
B’s banks from exporting their services to A and will also disadvantage them in competition in 
third markets; A’s  subsidy is inflicting genuine (Pareto-deteriorating) harm on B. Second, B’s gov- 
ernment may experience pressures (see the discussion of government failure) to respond with its 
own subsidies. 
40. The failure of BCCI, with substantial losses to depositors, is an exception, but it is an ex- 
plainable one. No country considered BCCI to be its responsibility; and the British government, 
which might have been the most concerned, was unlikely to be especially responsive to the politi- 
cal pressures of  the depositor groups (immigrants from African and Asian Commonwealth coun- 
tries) that were most affected. 
41. For example, in late 1993 and early  1994, the governments of Spain, France, Japan, and 
Venezuela separately indicated that they would absorb specific bank losses in their countries, so 
as to avoid imposing losses on liability holders. 
42. Also, the Basel Accord may have a secondary effect in reducing the problems of  cascading 
failures or depositor runs. However, though the Basel Accord points in the right direction, it is 
substantially flawed: its broad risk categories have no obvious empirical foundation; they ignore 
portfolio considerations; they ignore interest rate risk; and they are based on a cost-based historical 
book value accounting framework rather than a market-value accounting framework. Also, as dis- 
cussed in the text below, it may be very easy for countries to “cheat” on the accord if they choose 
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apply to IOSCO’s efforts to develop harmonized capital standards for securi- 
ties firms. 
Prices and markets. A frequent concern by  market makers and exchanges is 
that “outside” firms will free ride on the information-especially  the price 
information-generated  by the market. The outsider will thereby benefit and 
divert transactions away from the exchange. An additional concern is that such 
diversions  will reduce  the  transaction volumes  in  the primary market, with 
consequent  reductions  in its liquidity  and increases in its volatility. Finally, 
there are concerns that some market makers or exchanges may be willing to 
provide less transparency to transactions and will thereby attract the transac- 
tions of those who gain from reduced transparency. The competition among 
markets (and regulatory regimes) for this order flow may well lead to securities 
markets that generally have less transparency. 
These concerns about the relationships among markets have been the basis 
for calls for greater international harmonization of  regulatory provisions that 
would solve or ameliorate these problems. Again, though, closer examination 
is warranted. 
It is clear that the information yielded  by a market,  including its level of 
transparency, is a public good in the sense defined in section 7.3, and public 
goods can generate the problems described. But there may be less drastic mea- 
sures that can ameliorate the problem. 
With respect to the price information provided by markets, the relevant mar- 
ket maker or exchange could be assigned the property rights in the market’s 
information. This property-rights  approach, which is similar to the way  that 
other problems related to the creation and dissemination of information (intel- 
lectual property) in market-oriented economies are handled, would reduce free 
riding but need not unduly discourage the possible development of new forms 
of market making (see, e.g., Bronfman and Overdahl 1993). Further, it would 
be worthwhile for the exchanges themselves to investigate how their costs re- 
late to the services that they provide and whether they are pricing those ser- 
vices  appropriately.  For example, the value of  a dealer’s or market  maker’s 
capital is to serve as a buffer during adverse circumstances (e.g., unexpectedly 
volatile conditions). During favorable times, the market maker’s capital is re- 
dundant; during adverse times, it is vital. In essence, the market maker’s costs 
of making an orderly market are lower during favorable times and higher dur- 
ing adverse times. The market maker’s prices (e.g.,  spreads) for its services 
should  reflect  those  differential  costs.  To  try  to  maintain  uniform  spreads 
across good times and bad is to maintain a form of cross-subsidy-which,  as 
was noted in section 7.3, will invite entry and “cherry picking.” 
With respect to market fragmentation, the rapid improvements in telecom- 
munications and in data processing that have caused the apparent fragmenta- 
tion of local markets have also improved the ability of transactors to arbitrage 
across these local markets and thus have widened and deepened  the overall 
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Finally,  transparency  is  a  problem  that  probably  has  no  easy  solution. 
Though all transactors would like to be the recipients of the information that 
greater transparency would yield, larger transactors are reluctant to provide the 
necessary information about their own actions and positions. If required to do 
so by a market, they will try to find another forum where they are not required 
to do so-either  another formal market or informal (and even less well re- 
ported)  transactions  among themselves. Paradoxically,  an insistence on too 
great a level of transparency could reduce the actual levels of transparency 
achieved. 
International  harmonization  of  national  transparency  requirements  might 
prevent a competitive regulatory “race to the bottom,” but it might instead sim- 
ply drive large transactors away from organized markets and result in even less 
information’s being generated. The dangers of the latter outcome seem great 
enough that harmonization should only be attempted gingerly, or not at all. 
Information Regulation 
The needs of national regulators to enforce regulations that are information- 
intensive-for  example, restrictions on insider trading or on front running- 
can probably  be  satisfied  through  cooperation  and  information  exchanges 
among regulatory regimes. Harmonization is not necessary. 
For information regulation itself, however, the issues are more complex. The 
SEC’s dilemma with respect to non-U.S. firms, mentioned earlier in this sec- 
tion, is a good illustration. If US.  investors persist in investing in the non-U.S. 
companies, there is little that the  SEC can do. It might make the investors’ 
efforts a bit more difficult by refusing to allow any securities firm located in 
the United States to act as an agent for investors in these transactions. But if 
the U.S. investors persist and simply transact with agents abroad, then even 
more financial services will have been diverted from U.S. 
The SEC is trying another tack: it is allowing these firms’ securities to be 
sold in the United States without a restatement of the financial results to U.S. 
GAAP, but limiting their purchases to institutions; in essence, these securities 
are being treated as private placemenkM  Does this system of dual listing mean 
that U.S. firms are at a disadvantage? This would be true only if U.S. investors 
do not find the greater information provided by US. GAAP to be worth the 
extra costs to the U.S. firms of conforming to GAAP, or if the SEC’s reporting 
requirements are largely designed to remedy the “widows and orphans” type 
of market failure discussed in section 7.3. 
Ultimately, though, because other countries are unlikely to harmonize their 
accounting systems to U.S. GAAP (just so the U.S. markets could gain more 
43. In principle, the SEC could go even farther and try to forbid U.S. investors from even owning 
the securities of firms that do not report according to U.S. GAAP. In practice, this would be a 
system of capital controls that is unlikely to be politically acceptable in the United States or in 
other countries. 
44. See  Seidman  (1991);  Doty  (1992);  Kokkalenios  (1992); Schimkat  (1992);  and Torres 
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listings?), the SEC may have to ask difficult questions as to whether its strin- 
gent reporting requirements for U.S. firms are necessary-especially  in light 
of the evidence offered in a recent study that indicates that the lesser reporting 
requirements of other countries’ securities regulators may be adequate to pre- 
vent small investors from being at a disadvantage vis-a-vis larger (and possibly 
more knowledgeable) investors (Baumol and Malkiel 1992). 
The eventual harmonization of reporting requirements across the countries 
with major financial markets could well be worthwhile. The major advantage 
would  be a  savings  in  transaction  costs,  since  investors  (and  accountants) 
would need to learn and become familiar with only one set of accounting rules 
and their applications. (As a thought experiment, it is intriguing to imagine the 
transaction costs that would be present if each state in the United States had 
its own version  of  GAAP and required companies operating in that state to 
report their financial results in terms of that  state’s GAAP.) In essence, the 
accounting frameworks of these countries would become fully compatible with 
each  There are, however, potential costs. One danger is that diversity 
and the suitability of local accounting frameworks to local circumstances, and 
the opportunities for local experimentation within those frameworks, would be 
lost. Further, even though harmonization on a single accounting system might 
be worthwhile if the “right” system were chosen, the process of harmonization 
might result in the choice of some other framework, yielding a worse outcome 
than the current (albeit imperfect) pattern of diversity. 
An analogy may prove useful here. A compatible nationwide system of rail- 
roads with a uniform rail gauge has great value in reducing the transaction 
costs that would otherwise occur in transloading freight between incompatible 
rail systems. But different rail gauges might be best suited to different geo- 
graphic terrain or different types of freight, and the advantages of this diversity 
are  lost  when  uniformity  is  achieved. Also,  if  uniformity  were  somehow 
achieved with only a very narrow or a very broad gauge, the outcome of unifor- 
mity (in terms of the costs of hauling freight) might be worse than the nonuni- 
form system. 
There is no automatic answer to the question of whether the uniformity of a 
single accounting framework across all countries would be superior to the cur- 
rent pattern of different national systems.46  But the possibility that harmoniza- 
tion could yield gains is real and is worth further exploration. 
7.4.4  Is Harmonization Feasible? 
A final question worth considering is whether agreements among countries 
to harmonize and limit competition among their regulatory  regimes are fea- 
45. For  discussions of compatibility, see Braunstein and White (1985); and Economides and 
White (1993) and the references cited therein. 
46. In essence, the choice between a single system and the current diverse system is similar to 
asking whether a system of monopolistic competition in equilibrium provides too many or too few 
varieties. The answer, as shown by Spence (1976)  and Dixit and Stiglitz (l977), is “it all depends.” 231  International Regulation of Securities: Competition or Harmonization? 
sible; or whether the perceived private advantages of competition and the com- 
petitive instincts of the countries would be too strong. In the latter case, they 
would  be  tempted  to  “cheat”  on  any  harmonization  agreement, and  such 
agreements might soon unravel. 
Any harmonization  arrangement is likely to have multiple facets and mul- 
tiple unspecified details that could leave plenty of room for competitive ma- 
neuvering. For example, the Base1 Accord on minimum capital levels for com- 
mercial banks specifies only the broad categories and risk weights but leaves 
many definitions and details unspecified;  most important,  it is silent on the 
details of the accounting system that should be the basis for the calculation of 
capital levels. This flexibility gives national regulatory regimes wide room for 
competitive manipulation,  and over time the erosion of the accord could be- 
come substantial. 
In  sum, any  international  harmonization  arrangement  that  is designed to 
dampen competition among national regulatory regimes must face the same 
problem that confronts all cartel arrangements: how to prevent “cheating” by 
cartel members, which can cause the arrangement to unravel. Strong economic, 
political, and moral commitments by member countries will be necessary to 
make these arrangements work. 
7.5  Conclusion 
The question of whether the national regulation of near-globalized securities 
markets  should be subjected to international  harmonization  or international 
competition does not have an easy or simple answer. In this paper, I have used 
the concepts of market failure and government failure to provide a framework 
for considering the alternatives. Though international competition has a great 
deal of appeal and a strong presumption  favoring it, there are some limited 
circumstances where harmonization could yield significant benefits. Refining 
these possibilities and ensuring that any harmonization does indeed yield net 
benefits for the efficiency of securities markets will be a major task for public 
policy-national  and international-in  the coming decade. 
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Comment  John Y.  Campbell 
Lawrence White’s paper has many admirable features. Most basically, it starts 
from scratch, asking what precisely are the sources of market failure that might 
justify government regulation of securities markets in the first place. As a new- 
comer to the study of  financial regulation, I have been confused by  the ten- 
dency of many commentators to presume that the rationale for regulation  is 
commonly understood, when to me, at least, it remains mysterious. 
I also admire the paper’s balanced treatment of government failure. It is one 
thing to identify a market failure, quite another to argue that government inter- 
vention is the most practically effective way  to address the problem. And it is 
hard for any dispassionate observer of the U.S. system of banking and financial 
regulation  to believe that this  structure is in any sense optimal or precisely 
targeted at particular market failures. 
Finally, with some qualifications I agree with White’s view that competition 
between regulators-domestically  and, more importantly, internationally-is 
likely to improve outcomes. The rest of this comment reviews White’s taxon- 
omy of market failures and suggests some modifications, then proposes a tax- 
onomy of regulatory responses to international competition and discusses the 
choice among these responses. 
The Taxonomy of Market Failures 
The early items on White’s list are the “usual suspects” of microtheory: mar- 
ket power, economies of scale, and externalities. In unregulated financial mar- 
kets, market power is usually  thought to arise from economies of  scale. For 
example, it is sometimes argued that a securities exchange is a natural monop- 
oly because traders can obtain greater liquidity and lower effective transaction 
costs the  more traders are already using  a market. However, this  argument 
seems less compelling today in light of the evidence that different classes of 
traders may prefer different types of exchange. The phenomenon of  “competi- 
tion for order flow” seems to belie the notion that an exchange is a natural mo- 
nopoly. 
There is a stronger case for the importance of externalities in financial mar- 
kets.  Perhaps  most  obviously,  financial  innovators,  like  other  innovators, 
provide an uncompensated benefit to their competitors who can imitate their 
new products. Patent and copyright law are ineffective in limiting such imita- 
tion, just as they are in the computer software industry. Some economists have 
argued that lenders, be they banks or venture capitalists, provide an uncompen- 
sated benefit to their competitors who can observe the average return on their 
investments (Lang and Nakamura 1989). In a rather different spirit, some argue 
that financial  institutions that take on risk  impose uncompensated  costs on 
John Y. Campbell is the Otto Eckstein Professor of Applied Economics at Harvard University 
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other participants in the financial system by  increasing the risk of  a general 
financial crisis. It is hard to model this “systemic risk externality” formally, but 
many practitioners and regulators take it to be the most important justification 
for financial regulation. Finally, “network externalities” may be important in 
financial markets. Accounting conventions, for example, may be like other so- 
cial conventions in that their value increases with the number of people who 
use them. Unregulated markets may have multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, 
and there may be a case for government intervention to help society coordinate 
on the best equilibrium. 
So far so good, but the paper’s list of market failures becomes more prob- 
lematic as it continues. Uncertainty and asymmetric information are certainly 
important in financial markets, but they do not by themselves justify regula- 
tion. Individuals who cannot act in their own best interests may need investor 
protection, but I am uncomfortable with this argument because it can justify 
almost any government action. 
I am more sympathetic to some arguments for financial regulation that the 
paper does not mention. A sophisticated version of the investor-protection ar- 
gument considers the ex ante consequences of ex post compensation schemes. 
Such schemes have the potential to create a moral hazard problem as agents 
who expect to be compensated for future misfortunes  lose the incentive to 
protect themselves. One can understand a wide range of  government activity 
in these terms. Society’s unwillingness to tolerate poverty among the elderly 
led first to old-age relief and then to the social security system. Society’s com- 
passion for victims of  natural disasters led first to disaster relief and then to 
building codes. In banking, the desire to protect depositors and the payments 
system led to the establishment of deposit insurance in the 1930s; the savings 
and loan debacle of the 1980s has been an expensive reminder of the fact that 
deposit insurance gives banks incentives to take excessive risks, which must 
be offset by regulation. In financial markets more generally, regulation may 
be necessary if  small investors expect to be compensated for losses and act 
accordingly.’ While the best solution may be to limit compensation and expec- 
tations of compensation, this may not always be possible. 
The revenue argument recognizes that regulation may be necessary to main- 
tain the government’s tax base. Given that all realistically feasible taxes are 
distortionary, the optimal tax system may require some taxation of the financial 
system with accompanying regulation. Some countries raise large amounts of 
revenue through seigniorage, which is effectively a tax on bank reserves; this 
requires regulation to inhibit banks’ efforts to economize on reserves and to 
limit competition from nonbank financial institutions.2 Other countries have 
I. A variation of this argument considers the costs imposed on society by  investors’ efforts to 
obtain compensation. Litigation over Lloyd’s of London insurance losses, for example, is likely to 
tie up the British court system for years. 
2. It has been estimated that the recent deregulation of the Spanish banking system has cost the 
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significant  securities  transaction  taxes;  the  United  Kingdom,  for example, 
raises about $1.5 billion per year from its stamp duty on transactions in British 
equities. Some regulation is inevitable if such taxes are to raise any revenue. 
I  believe that these two arguments for financial regulation  are at least as 
important as the standard ones cited in White’s paper. In addition, one should 
not forget that a major motive for regulation, if not exactly an argument for it, 
is to protect the market power of domestic financial institutions whose interests 
are represented by regulators. 
Alternative Regulatory Responses to International Competition 
It is useful to supplement the taxonomies given in the paper with a classifi- 
cation of  regulatory approaches to international competition. Regulators can 
handle international competition in four ways. First, they can deny foreign ac- 
cess to domestic customers, thereby restoring autarky and the market power of 
domestic financial institutions. Second, they can allow foreign access to do- 
mestic customers but apply domestic regulations; under this approach, foreign 
competition erodes the market power of domestic financial institutions but not 
the market power of domestic regulators. Third, regulators can allow foreign 
access to domestic customers subject to foreign regulations. This is the ap- 
proach of the European Union’s Single Market; a financial institution or prod- 
uct is presumed to be sound if it is approved in its home market. Finally, regula- 
tors  can negotiate  to  harmonize  regulations  so  that  the  second  and  third 
approaches become equivalent. 
It is sometimes argued that international competition is so potent that regu- 
lators do not really have these choices. On this argument, only the third and 
fourth options are available to regulators. This ignores the fact that govern- 
ments do have some control over domestic customers through their power to 
define which contracts are legally enforceable and which are not. US.  states 
use this power to regulate insurance provided to their residents, and the United 
Kingdom uses this power to regulate ownership transfers in U.K. equities. 
If  all four approaches to international competition are feasible, how should 
we judge their relative merits? The first approach serves only the interests of 
domestic financial institutions, but there are some arguments in favor of each 
of the other approaches. The second approach seems appropriate where there 
are differences across countries in the optimal degree of  financial regulation. 
Countries may differ, for example, in the degree to which small investors ac- 
cept the principle of caveat emptor and thus in the extent of investor protection 
they require. Different payments systems may involve different regulations to 
limit systemic risk, and different tax systems may require different supporting 
regulations. It is often argued that regulations should be harmonized  across 
countries to maintain a level playing field; this argument applies to regulations 
that discriminate between domestic and foreign suppliers of financial services, 
but may not apply to regulations that discriminate between domestic and for- 
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The third approach has the great merit, emphasized in White’s paper, that it 
maintains competition among different national regulators. Competition serves 
to reduce the direct costs of  regulation and the indirect costs of compliance, 
and it limits the tendency of regulators to stifle financial innovation. The im- 
portance of this is brought home by Franks and Schaefer’s (1993) comparison 
of  direct regulatory  costs  in  the  United  States, the  United  Kingdom,  and 
France. Franks and Schaefer report that direct costs of regulation of securities 
and options trading are 1.3 percent of noninterest expense in the United States, 
but only 0.5 percent in the United Kingdom. For life insurance, the differences 
are even more dramatic; direct regulatory costs are 0.12 percent of premium 
income in the United States, but only 0.04 percent in the United Kingdom and 
0.03 percent in France. If the higher costs of U.S. regulation do not correspond 
to benefits for consumers of  financial services, then they represent an ineffi- 
ciency that may be reduced by international regulatory competition. 
An important question is how one can reconcile regulatory competition with 
the desire of regulators to protect domestic investors. One approach is for regu- 
lators to draw a clear distinction between domestically regulated and guaran- 
teed financial institutions  and products  and other institutions  and products, 
which can compete on the basis of  their own national regulations and guaran- 
tees. This is analogous to the “narrow banking” proposal under which deposit 
insurance  would apply only to certain  strictly regulated  banks,  while other 
banks would compete without the regulatory burden but also without the bene- 
fit of deposit insurance. 
Finally, international  harmonization  may  be  useful  where  there  are im- 
portant  externalities  in  the  international  financial  system.  International 
agreements establishing  common accounting  conventions and reporting re- 
quirements can be seen as a device for coordinating  financial markets on a 
superior equilibrium in which information is cheaper to provide and easier to 
understand.  Similarly, agreements to establish international netting schemes 
may reduce risks in the international payments system. The growth of deriva- 
tives trading makes this an increasingly important area for international co- 
operation. 
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Comment  Mary Ann Gadziala 
The topic Lawrence White selected for discussion raises issues that are both 
intellectually stimulating and highly relevant to current international regula- 
tion. A significant challenge presented by the explosive movement toward full 
globalization of the securities markets is ensuring that the regulatory structure 
promotes  efficient,  competitive,  stable, and  safe global  markets. White has 
posed an important question: Would capital markets benefit more from “har- 
monization” of  rules or from “competition”  among regulatory regimes? He 
concludes that there is a strong presumption favoring international competition 
and that national regulation  of  near-globalized  securities markets  should be 
subjected to international harmonization in only certain limited circumstances. 
I agree with that specific conclusion. However, I would approach the analy- 
sis in a somewhat different manner. For purposes of  my analysis, the world- 
wide securities markets would be viewed as the market, regulation as the prod- 
uct, and the various national regulators as competitors creating the product. 
To parallel White’s analysis, I would begin with the theoretical question of 
whether the market would be better served by  harmonization, which creates 
monopoly regulation, or by competitive regulation. This is a theoretical ques- 
tion because there is no “world congress” or similar entity that might impose 
such monolithic harmonized regulation. In the current international securities 
market, any movement toward uniformity-or  harmony in the broad sense- 
could be achieved  only through the competitive process. 
Therefore, the second and key question in my analysis is, In what circum- 
stances will the competitive process among national regulators lead to diversity 
and in what circumstances will it lead to homogeneity of  international regu- 
lation? 
I would like to take a few minutes to elaborate on each of these questions. 
Monopoly Harmonization versus Competition 
First, let’s explore the theoretical question of whether harmonization or com- 
petition  in international regulation  would best  serve our  securities markets. 
Preliminarily,  it  should be  noted  that  mandated  harmonization  would  be  a 
major undertaking, since it would necessitate the creation of a mechanism to 
impose monopoly regulation on the world securities markets. Beyond that cost, 
we should analyze the costs and benefits of the respective processes: harmoni- 
zation and competition. 
The current debate over the structure of the bank regulatory system in the 
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United States offers some valuable insights. On the national level, harmoniza- 
tion can be real, rather than theoretical. The U.S. Treasury has proposed virtu- 
ally complete mandated harmonization of U.S. federal bank regulation-one 
superregulator to replace the four current regulators. The Treasury argues that 
this would reduce costs by eliminating inconsistencies, inefficiencies, and du- 
plication. Recognizing that these superficial benefits may be achieved, the Fed- 
eral Reserve and the majority of U.S. banks have opposed the harmonization. 
They have argued that 
a monolithic monopoly regulator would become inflexible; 
there would be no diversity of regulatory views to eliminate bad proposals 
the monopoly regulator would be likely to swing from excessive tough- 
the healthy  process  of  dynamic tension  in  setting balanced  regulatory 
and moderate incentives for lax supervision; 
ness to ease, based upon cyclical complaints; and 
standards would be lost. 
The elements of this debate may be an appropriate starting point for the analy- 
sis of regulatory harmonization versus competition on the international level. 
The Competitive Process May Lead to “Harmonized” Rules 
This brings us to the main question: In what circumstances will the competi- 
tive process among national regulators result in some form of  “harmonized” 
international regulation? This analysis might be aided by  considering some 
examples where the competitive process is now at work. 
While the regulatory competitive process is dynamic, continually in play in 
the market, the process is generally widely dispersed, and convergence may 
occur at a slow evolutionary pace. This would make analysis difficult. There- 
fore, for purposes of analysis, it may be best to examine the operation of the 
process in an international forum-such  as the Bank for International Settle- 
ments or the International Organization of Securities Commissions. These or- 
ganizations were created to accelerate the competitive process in a closed set- 
ting where information is concentrated. We might look specifically at capital 
requirements where a minimum standard was established for bank credit risks, 
but no consensus was reached for securities firms. We might also look at ac- 
counting standards where agreement was finally reached on a standard cash 
flow statement, but work continues on further accords. 
The competitive process requires the various regulators to deal with such 
factors as legal and market segmentation; unique market characteristics; dif- 
fering developmental levels; and societal, cultural, and prudential needs. Regu- 
latory regimes are analyzed, defended, and rethought, balancing competitive 
and customer protection  interests. Market stability, integrity, and prudential 
concerns are key. It is also through this convergence process that “market and 
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all of these factors in situations where consensus was reached, and where it 
was not, should provide valuable insights for generalizing the circumstances 
where the competitive process leads to “harmonized” international regulation. 
In the case where national regulators have competed to an equilibrium level 
and agreed upon a regulatory standard, it is not set in stone. It is important that 
the standard be appropriately implemented and enforced. However, divergence 
is not necessarily  “cheating”; it may in fact be an appropriate continuation of 
the competitive process to ensure that regulation remains state-of-the-art and 
responsive to innovative market developments. 
One additional point is worth noting-harmonization  and competition are 
at opposite ends of a continuum of international regulation. Along that contin- 
uum, other alternatives-such  as mutual recognition  or bilateral  accords- 
may maximize benefits to the market in particular circumstances. 
In conclusion, there is no existing mechanism for subjecting the regulation 
of international securities markets to monopoly harmonization. Harmonization 
can be achieved only through the competitive process among national regula- 
tors. This process operates continually with the goal of creating a regulatory 
structure that maximizes the stability, integrity, resilience, and competitiveness 
of our interdependent capital markets. At times, the competitive process may 
lead to diversity in international regulation; at other times, it may lead to homo- 
geneity or harmony. 
As the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission said in a recent 
speech, this process must be “one that meets our common needs, without for- 
saking our individual mandates.” Finding and maintaining the appropriate bal- 
ance, through the competitive process among national regulators, is indeed a 
difficult challenge in the current, dynamic international securities market. 